This paper demonstrates that an important role of intermediaries in supply chains is to reduce the financial risk faced by retailers. It is well known that risk averse retailers when faced by the classical single-period inventory (newsvendor) problem will order less than the expected value maximizing (newsboy) quantity. We show that in such situations a risk neutral distributor can offer a menu of mutually beneficial contracts to the retailers. We show that a menu can be designed to simultaneously: (i) induce every risk averse retailer to select a unique contract from it; (ii) maximize the distributor's expected profit; and (iii) raise the order quantity of the retailers to the expected value maximizing quantity. Thus inefficiency created due to risk aversion on part of the retailers can be avoided. We also investigate the influence of productlmarket characteristics on the offered menu of contracts.
Introduction
We consider a single-period model in which multiple risk averse retailers purchase a single product from a common vendor. We assume that the retailers operate in identical and independent markets and face uncertain customer demand. The retailers are assumed to be price takers and to sell the product at the same fixed price. They accordingly make their purchase order quantity decision in order to maximize their expected utility. The vendor has to offer the same supply contract to each retailer. The terms of the contract offered to the retailers are similar to the ones found in the classical newsvendor problem. Under this contract, each retailer purchases a certain quantity at a regular purchase price. If the realized demand is greater than the quantity ordered then the retailer has the option to purchase the units that are short at an emergency purchase price that is higher than the regular price. If the demand is less than the order quantity then the retailer has the option to return the leftover inventory at a salvage price that is lower than the regular price. (This contract will be referred to as the Original Newsvendor Contract (ONC) in the sequel).
It is well known that the risk averse retailer's order quantity (i.e., the one that maximizes his expected utility) will be smaller than the order quantity that maximizes the tity. Therefore, risk aversion of the retailers has been portrayed in the literature as leading to the loss of efficiency in-supply chains. (We use the term "efficiency" to refer to the combined expected profit of the seller and the retailer. In general, this term refers to the total expected profit of all participants in a supply chain).
In this paper we show not only that this loss of efficiency can be eliminated through risk reducing pricing contracts but also that any risk neutral intermediary will find it beneficial to offer such risk reducing contracts to the retailers. In our model, the intermediary is referred to as the distributor1 and purchases the goods as per the terms of the ONC from the vendor (see Fig. I ). In turn the distributor offers the goods to the retailers on contract terms that are less risky from the retailers' viewpoint. The distributor is a financial non-stocking intermediary such as a buying group or a sourcing agent, whose sole role in this paper is to "buy" goods at the ONC and "sell" them to retailers through less risky contracts without changing the flow of the products. This is done in order to isolate the risk intermediation function of the distributor. In Section 3 we show that even if there are economies associated with a stocking distributor, such as risk pooling and transportation consolidation, the nature of contracts offered is similar. We propose that, as opposed to the retailer's expected profit (~a r o n , 19f3; Eeckhoudt et ol., ' The distributor can be an independent firm, or the vendor, or Horowitz3 1970)-Eeckhoudt (Igg5) give exone of the retailers. For the sake of clarity we will refer to the amples in which risk averse retailers will order nothing as the distributor, and the risk averse players due to high demand uncertainty. Obviously, the reduo facing uncertain demand as the retailers. The analysis, though, tion in the order quantity of the retailer leads to 'lower is valid for anv two levels in a vertical marketing channel. where w expected profit (for the re tailer) compared to the expected the lower level facing uncertain demand is risk averse and the profit obtained under the profit maximizing order quanupper level is risk neutral (or less risk averse). ONC, under the risk reducing contracts offered by the distributor to the retailers, the emergency purchase and the salvage prices should be set equal to the regular purchase price, and that in addition a fixed payment should be made by the distributor to the retailer (see Fig. 2 ).
Therefore, a retailer's payoff consists of a fixed component (independent of the demand) and a variable component that increases linearly with the realized demand. Consequently, as the retailer's payoff depends only upon the demand, the retailer is indifferent to the order quantity decision and is content to relegate the responsibility of determining an order quantity to the distributor. The distributor makes the order quantity decision fully aware that he has to satisfy all the demand faced by the retailer. The distributor bears the cost if necessary of buying the product at the emergency purchase cost and also if necessary of disposing of any unsold product at the salvage price. We prove that by performing this function of "(demand) risk intermediation" the distributor raises the retailers' order quantities such that the maximum efficiency is obtained. Our key contribution in this paper is to establish that the contracts offered to the retailer not only maximize the efficiency in the supply chain but are also optimal from the distributor's viewpoint. This paper is the first to show how supply contracts can play a crucial role in the reduction of financial risk resulting from demand uncertainty. This paper models the role of incentives (embodied in pricing contracts) in supply chains where uncertainty leads to inefficient decision making. Instead of entirely focusing on the risk averse retailers' order quantity decisions (as done in the entire literature dealing with the risk averse newsvendor problem) we are the first to focus on optimal mechanisms that can be used to influence the decisions of the retailers.
The problem of designing pricing contracts under demand uncertainty and risk aversion is complicated because of the following reasons:
(i) We allow the retailers to differ with regard to their aversion to risk. Therefore, different retailers may derive different expected utility from the same contract. (ii) The distributor does not know how risk averse any particular retailer is and only knows the distribution of risk aversion among the retailers. (iii) The laws against price discrimination prohibit the distributor from offering different contracts selectively to different retailers, i.e., any contract that the distributor decides to offer to a specific retailer, has to be offered to all the retailers.
Contracts similar to the ones proposed in this paper are being adopted within the context of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) programs. In many VMI programs the vendors make the inventory decisions on behalf of the retailers and also bear the risks and costs associated with these decisions (Andel, 1996) . In addition to the contracts found in VMI programs, we have observed several supply contracts, for example in the publishing (Carvajal, 1998), cosmetics (Moses and Seshadri, 2000) , personal computers (Kirkpatrick, 1997) , apparel and grocery industries (Bird and Bounds, 1997; Lucas, 1996) , that transfer the demand risk from the buyer to the vendor. We also see a trend in industry wherein simpje price discounting contracts that were previously offered by the vendors (to induce the retailers to purchase a larger quantity) are being substituted by relatively sophisticated contracts that are designed to transfer the demand risk from the retailers to their vendors. As discussed in an extensive survey o f pricing contracts by Tsay et al. (1999) , channel coordination and risk sharing are important reasons for such contracts. Therefore, economic justification for such contracts is not complete unless, as done in this paper, the impact of risk reduction for risk averse retailers is care-fully accounted for, and the optimal form of incentives (i.e., contracts) is established taking into account the nature of the risk and the retailer's aversion to risk.
In Section 2, we begin our analysis by showing that in general it is not in the distributor's best interest to offer the same contract to all retailers. In other words, the distributor does not in general maximize either his own expected profit or the efficiency, by simply buying and reselling the product to all retailers on the same terms. In Section 3, we derive the menu of contracts that maximizes the expected profit of the distributor. This menu rather interestingly also maximizes the efficiency. Every contract in the menu has two parameters: (i) a fixed payment that the distributor makes to the retailer; and (ii) a unit price that the distributor charges the retailer for every unit sold by the retailer. (The choice of this form of each contract in the menu is neither random nor accidental. We prove that these contract terms create stochastic payoffs for the risk averse retailer that dominate the payoffs under the terms of the ONC in a strong sense). We emphasize that the menu does not depend on the distributor's knowledge of the degree of risk aversion of each and every retailer, but only upon the knowledge of the distribution of risk aversion over the ensemble of retailers. The menu of contracts is either continuously or discretely parameterized by the fixed side payment and the selling price depending upon whether the distribution of risk aversion is a discrete one or a continuous one. Each retailer selects a contract from the menu, choosing the one that provides him the highest expected utility. The menu of contracts derived by us has the following special properties:
Every (risk averse) retailer selects a unique contract from the menu. The menu always contains a risk free (fixed payment) contract. This contract is selected by a subset of retailers that are the most risk averse. Retailers who are less risk averse, prefer the contracts with higher expected profit and utility (and consequently bear higher risk). The retailer is willing to relegate the ordering decision to the distributor. Furthermore, the order quantity stipulated by the distributor is the Expected Value (EV) maximizing solution to the newsvendor problem. Therefore, the menu of contracts is also instrumental in maximizing efficiency. The menu of contracts maximizes the distributor's expected profit.
1.1. Relevant titerature 1.1.1. Supply chain coordination A comprehensive review of recent research on contracts in supply chains is given in Tsay er al. (1999) . In contrast to these papers, the inclusion of risk aversion in supply chain coordination, and optimal design within a class of contracts are the novel features of our work. Moreover, our research is aimed at understanding how contracts, and in particular risk sharing plays a role in determining the distribution channel structure.
Traditional quantity discounts while widely used can not achieve complete coordination between the buyers and the seller for two reasons: (i) the (risk sharing) benefits as described by us can not be attained by simply varying the price as a function of the order quantity; and (ii) franchise fees are often required in addition to quantity discounts for achieving maximal channel profits (Oren et al., 1983; Weng, 1995) . It is now well understood that such failures in coordination can arise as a result of using improperly constructed price schedules. The theory of non-linear pricing (Wilson, 1993) can be used to determine the price schedule in such situations. Quantity discounts and franchise fees are also examples of nonlinear pricing. The menu of contracts necessary for inducing the retailers' participation in the distributor's network is yet another example of using a nonlinear price schedule to separate out retailers with different attitudes towards risk.
Our work is also related to research on insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1 976; Stiglitz, 1977) . The menu offered to the retailers takes a'way some or all of the demand risk faced by them; and in return for this insurance the distributor extracts payment by reducing the expected value of the contract.
Model, assumptions, and analysis
We consider the classical single-period inventory problem. In this problem, the distributio~l of the demand as well as the retail price, p, are given. The retailer's problem is to choose the order quantity, S. In the contract, items are supplied at an initial unit price of c. If the demand in the period exceeds the quantity ordered, S, then the retailer obtains emergency shipments to cover any excess demand at a unit cost of e. If the demand is less than S, the retailer sends the unsold items back to the seller, and obtains a credit of s per unit returned. The framework has been extended by us to incorporate risk aversion as well as to model multiple retailers as follows.
Model assump r ions
1. The retailers are alike in terms of demand distribution and cost parameters, and differ only with regard to their aversion to risk. We will discuss in the conclusions how the optimal contracts derived by us can be extended when retailers of different size are present. 2. The retailer demands are independent and identically distributed random variables. The retail price ( p ) and the distribution of demand are unaffected by the contracts offered to the retailers. 3. Every contract has to be offered to every retailer.
The retailer in turn selects a contract from the menu offered. This condition prevents direct (illegal) price discrimination by the distributor. 4. The retailers are not resellers, but purchase only to satisfy their own demand (Wilson, 1993) .
5. The distributor is risk-neutral (the distributor can be the manufacturer itself or the least risk averse retailer). 6. We use utility functions for money. Until Section 3 we make no additional assumption about the utility functions of retailers, except that the utility functions are concave and nondecreasing in the amount of wealth. From Section 3 onwards, the small gambles framework is adopted in our analysis (Pratt, 1964) . 7. Retailers are Expected Utility (EU) maximizer, where, EU = Expected Value (EV)the risk premlum.
8. We. assume that the general form of contracts that are made available to the retailers are given by W(F,c,s,e), where, F = fixed side payment to the retailer;c = regular purchase pricelunit; s = salvage valuelunit of the unsold retailer stock; E = emergency purchase pricelunit; and, p 2 e 2 c 2 s. The ONC the retailer can be written using this notation as V(0, c, s, e ) .
9. I f two contracts provide the same EU to a retailer, the retailer will choose the contract that has the larger fixed payment. If the distributor offers a contract that provides the same EU as the ONC, to the retailer, then the retailer will choose the contract offered by the distributor.
These modeling assumptions hold if (i) the product by itself contributes a small portion to the retailer's wealth (for Assumption 6); and (ii) retailers serve their local markets, and these markets have little or no overlap (for Assumption 2). Assumption 9 is standard in the analysis of such problems, for example see the discussion in Kreps (1990) . The assumption allows us to work with weak inequalities in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss how Assumption 1 can be relaxed.
A single retailer
In this section we consider the case of a single risk averse retailer, and show that a risk neutral intermediary has an incentive to offer a risk sharing contract to the retailer. This has the effect of raising the order quantity to the EV maximizing value. The single period demand will be denoted as D, its distribution, mean and standard deviation as FD(.), 11, and a. The retailer's utility function for payoffs is U(.), a concave non-decreasing function. Let E[.] stand for the expected value, and for the positive part of A. The random pay-off given the ordering quantity S, can be written as n(S, F, c, s, e) The EU and EV maximizing order quantities, denoted as s&, and sf;, are given by
(3) 1 t is well known that: (i) Thus by construction we see that there exist contracts such that
The proof of the lemma is based on establishing that the distribution function of the retailer's profit under the new contract will cross the distribution function of profit under the ONC from above and at most at a single point. The profit to the retailer under the ONC can be written as a function of the demand (D) as follows Similarly, the profit to the retailer under the new contract is given by, From Equations (4) and ( 5 ) , and the condition, p 2 c' 2 e > s, the slope of profit as a function of D under the new contract is not larger than the slope under the ONC, see Fig. 3 . It follows 6om this observation and the condition E [ I J ( s~~, F ,~, c ' , c ' ) ]  1~[ n ( s &~, O , c , s , e ) ] that I~ (S:$, F , c', c', c') intersects [TI (s:,, 0, c, s , e) ] at most once and from above. It can be verified that the intersection will take place if sZ, 2 F/(c'c), and it takes place at the point From Theorem 3.A.1 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) or from the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970 , 1971 , 1972 , if the utility function of the retailer is increasing and concave in wealth then, E[u (~(s:,'~, F, c',   c', c') )] 2 E [ W~(~, U , ,   0, c , s, e ) ) l
This result can be strengthened as follows. Define "tr to be more risk averse than u" when v ( . ) = k(u(-)), where k(-) is an increasing concave function, see for example Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1 974). .
Theorem 2.1. Given P 2 0 and a retailer "x" who has an increasing utility funcrion, u ( . ) , such that this retailer is indzflerent bet ween [he contracts V ( Fp, c', c', c' ) and the ONC, then every retailer with an increasing utility function u ( . ) , who is more risk averse than retailer "x" will prefer W ( F -b, c', c', c') l l (~f~,~, d , c ' , c ' ) is smaller than n(S&,,O, c, s, e ) in the dispersive order.
Proof. Let the distribution functions of the profit under the ONC and the contract V(F,c',c',c' ) be GoNC and GNEw From Fig. 1 , we observe that G&,(a) -G&(u) Fig. 3. Retailer's profit under different contracts. is increasing in a E ( 0 , l ) . From the discussion given in Section, 2.B. 1 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (1 994), this is a sufficient condition for rI (Sf;, F , c', c', c') to be smaller than H(s&,, 0, c, s, e) in the dispersive order. (For a definition of dispersive ordering see Bickel and Lehmann (1979) or Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) ). Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) have proved the following theorem:
The following two relations bet ween dbtribution functions F and G are equivalent: ( i ) F is less dispersed than G; (ii) for every non-decreasing function U and non-decreasing and concave function h such that U ( x ) and h ( U ( x ) ) = V ( x ) are integrable under G, Lemma 2.1 thus gets sharpened by Theorem 2.1 to include utility functions that are increasing in wealth. We also know that a risk neutral retailer will either prefer or be indifferent to the new contract. Therefore the contract offered by the distributor will of course be preferred by any retailer who is more risk averse than the risk neutral retailer.
Given that the distributor can induce the retailer to take a "risk sharing" contract, the order quantity has to be decided upon by the distributor. We now prove that the optimal order quantity that the distributor will stipulate to the retailer is the EV maximizing solution to the original newsvendor problem.
Lemma 2.3. The optimal ordering quantity for the distributor is s~;(o, c , S , e ) .
Proof. If the distributor offers the contract V ( F , c', c', d ) then the distributor's expected profit as a function of S can be written as [ n ( S , 0 , c, s , e ) ] -(F + ( pc ' )~) . ( 7 ) .
Multiple retailers
In this section we consider the case when there are multiple retailers. Assume that the distributor offers the same contract % (F, ct, cl, c') to all the retailers. We restrict attention to practical contracts in which d _< p. This class of contracts will be called We,. The contract Y?(F,p,p,p) will be called a "risk free" contract because the retailer is paid a fixed fee F regardless of the quantity sold.
Theorem 2.2. l j the distributor oflers a single contract to the distributor to offer contracts to all the retailers. In the whole population of retailers, and there are no disecoorder to answer this question, we adopt the small gambles nontics of scale in distribution, then the contract ofired will framework, see Assumption 6. It is quite difficult to obbe a rkk free contract of rhe form Q ( F , p , p , p ) . Moreover tain closed form results without this simplification. the cotttract that maximizes rhe distributor's expec~edprojit However, the insights we obtain into the optimal menu of need not be selected by the entire population of retailers. contracts, in our view, adequately compensates for the simplification. In this framework, the "local" aversion to Proof. Let the distributor offer a contract 9 ( F , c ' , c ' , d ) . Let the set of retailers who accept this contract be A. The total number of retailers that accept this contract is given by m = card[J(]. Let c' < p. Consider the alternate contract, W (FI , p , p , p) , such that fi = F + ( pc')p. Contract W (F1 , p , p , p ) gives the same expected profit to the distributor as contract O(F, c', c', c') . From Lemma 2.1 the new contract will be taken by all the retailers in A. Moreover, because of Assumption 9, retailers who are not in J L may also take this contract. The proof of the first part now follows from the assumption that there are no diseconomies of scale in distribution.
For the second part, we observe that the fixed side payment will have to increase in order to attract more retailers to accept the risk free contract. Therefore counter examples can be constructed to show that a contract of the form Q(F, p, p, p) that maximizes distributor's expectedprofit need not be selected by all the retailers.
¤
Risk pooling in supply chains has been studied by several researchers, see for example Eppen and Schrage (1981) , Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) , Schwartz et al. (1985), Jackson and Muckstadt (1 989) and Schwartz (1989). Tsay et al. (1999) discuss pricing contracts that exploit these economies for risk neutral retailers. As shown by their work, risk pooling leads to economies of scale in distribution under fairly general conditions. Therefore, from the viewpoint of minimizing the total cost of holding inven tbry, cost of emergency shipment and salvage cost, the distributor prefers to add more retailers to the distribution network. On the other hand, in order to attract more retailers, the distributor has to make increasingly attractive offers to all the retailers. Thus after attracting several of the most risk averse retailers to take a contract, the marginal profit to the distributor from inducing an extra retailer to accept the contract can become negative. The risk pooling and risk sharing effects therefore work in opposite directions. We have carried out numerical investigations to understand just how the risk pooling and risk sharing cffects interact when the distributor is constrained to offer a single contract of the form Q(F, c', c', c') to all the retailers. Details can be obtained from the authors.
Multiple contracts
The question that naturally follows from the second part of Theorem 2.1 is whether there is an incentive (at all) for risk determines the relative preference of a decision maker between two gambles, see for example Pratt (1964) . Define the coefficient of risk aversion p at a wealth level of w to be equal to - Ut'(w)/U'(w), where U(+) V(0, c, s, e ) .
We assume that every retailer in JV has a strictly positive order quantity under the ONC, and therefore has a strictly positive reservation utility. We shall consider contracts from the class Vq. To simplify the notation, we denote a contract from this class as V (F,c') . The expected utility to retailer i from the contract %(F, c') is given by E l U ( n ( S , F , c', c', c') 
The distributor offers the same menu of contracts to all the retailers in JV (Assumption 3). The menu will be written as 1 = { ( E , ci) ). The set of retailers who accept a contract from this set, 9, will be denoted as A(2). To keep the notation simple, we also denote the contract accepted by retailer i from the set 9 as (fi, ci). To focus on the risk sharing role played by the distributor, we have chosen not to model any scale economies obtained from risk pooling or from transportation. Therefore we assume that the distributor does not carry any inventory and trans-shipments between retailers are not allowed. There is no loss of generality in making this assumption as long as there are no scale diseconomies in distribution, see Section 4. The distributor's profit maximization problem is shown below.
(P) : max C ( E [~( S : ; ,~, C , S ,~) ] -(Fi + (P -c~) P ) ) , Proof. (i) Using Si as the ordering quantity for both 1 i~~( 9 ) retailers i and i -1, we get,
Subject to
. .
Similarly using Si as the ordering quantity for retailers i (10) a n d i + l , weget,
The distributor's objective is to offer a menu that will maximize her expected profit, see Equation (7). The first set of constraints, (lo), defines the set A ( 2 )a retailer will accept some contract from the menu of the contracts, only if his expected utility from the contract is at least as great as his reservation utility (Assumption 9). The second set of constraints given in (1 1) requires that the retailer will pick that contract from the menu which gives him the highest EU. We assume that 9 consists of undominated contracts, that is, there is no contract in the menu which is strictly preferred to another by all retailers. We need the following properties of the retailers' reservation utilities for characterizing the set 9.
Part (i) of the lemma follows from combining inequalities ( 1 5) and (1 6).
(ii) If the salvage value s, is strictly smaller than the unit price c, then for all i the retailers' optimal order quantity under the ONC, Si, is less than some large number M. By assumption Si > 0. We know that f ( S )pg(S) is a continuously differentiable function of S. Therefore, the first order condition for optimality should hold at S; for every retailer i, i.e., Moreover, if S > 0 and 0 > 0, then h ( S ) > 0. Hence, if P j # Pi, then goes to prove that inequalities (1 5 ) and (16) are strict. H
Proof.
For the sake of convenience we use, g(S) for We now prove in Theorem 3.1 that every retailer will E [IT(s, 0, c , s, e) ] and h(S) for Var[n(S, 0, c , s, e ) ] / 2 . By select a contract from the menu in the optimal solution to our definition of reservation utilities, the distributor's problem. After showing this result, the precise characterization of the optimal menu of contracts ri = m a x [~[ n (~, 0, c, s,e)l -~i V a r l n ( S , 0, c>s~e)]/21 will be given in Theorem 3.2. S r Theorem 3.1. Every retailer will be included in the set A ( 2 ) in the optimal solution to problem (P). Let Si = Sj(O)c,s,e) be the optimal ordering quantity under the ONC which gives the retailer i his reservation Proof. The theorem follows from Lemmas 3.3 to 3.5 utility ri. Assume that ri > ri+l, i.e., given below. Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5 show that the distribg(S,)pih(Si) > @ ; + I ) -pj+lh(Si+~). (12) utor's profit maximizing menu of contracts is such that the most and the least risk averse retailers in Af select a Since, pi 2 P i + ] , contract from it. Lemma 3.4 shows that every other g(Si) -pi+,h(Si) 2 g ( s i ) -Pih(Si).
(13) retailer will also select a contract from the menu. Equations (12) and (13) contradict the optirnality of si+l Define the expected utility to retailer i, from the contract for retailer ( i + I). The proof of part (ii) is similar-~( 4 , s), as ii ($f(4, ci) ). Where there is no scope for confusion, we shall omit the dependence on %'(K,ci), and Lemma 3.2. (i) r is a convex function of p, i.e., for > write ti for b(%'(fi,ci) ). We now state properties of the Pi > P i + l , optimal solution to problem (P) that are used to prove r,+l-ri ri-ri-1 Lemmas 3.3 to 3.5, The proofs of the properties as well as 2 the lemmas are given in Appendix A. Pi-Pi+l s, o > 0, and the demand distribution 13 Property 1. I j i < j, and fhere exists a k , i < k < j, such   continuous, then r is a strictly convex function of p.   that retailer k@ Af(1) , then ci f cj.
Property 2. I f pi > p,, then C i 2 cj. Property 3. If pi > p,, and Ci 2 cj (ci > c,), then 6 2 4(E. > 4). Property 4. I j ci > cj, a > 0, and retailer j prefers the   contract (4, c,) over ( F , c i ) , rhen all retailers k 2 j will also preJer (out of the two contracts) (4, c j ) to (F;, c ; ) , Property 5. If ci > cj, a > 0, and retailer i prefers the   contract (6, c i ) over (5) cj) , then all retailers k _< i will also prefer (out of the two contracts) (4, ci) to (4, c,) . Property 6. I f i < j, and the two retailers take the contracts (4, c;) and (4, cj) , then retailer j gets at least Be same EV from his contract as retailer i from the contract (4, c i ) .
Property 7.
the EU to a retailer is the same from two contracts (4, c i ) and (4, c j ) , and ci 2 cj, then the E V to the retailer from the contract (4, c,) is greater than the E V /Lorn the contract (F,,ci) .
Property 8. I f a risk averse retailer i obtains the same EU from the contract (4,q) as from the ONC, then the dirtrihuror stand to proJit from offering the contract (fi, ci) to this retailer.
Recall that indices I and n denote the most and the least risk averse retailers in M . Let ~M~N and iMAX stand for the most and least averse retailers in 4 9 ) . Lemma 3.3. If ~M I N > 1, then the distributor should also ir~clude a contract in the menu that will be selected by any retailer "a", whose coeficient o/ risk aversion p, > (or equivalently, a < iMIN). I n words, if there is a more rlsk averse retailer in N, who is currently not included in A(%), then it is in the distributor's interest lo ofler a contract that is attracfive to such a retailer.
Lemma 3.4. If the distributor's menu contains contracts that are token by retailers i and j, (j > i, pi > pj), there is no retailer a E A(9) such thal i < a < j, but 3 a E N , i < a < j, then the distributor should also include a contract which is attractive to retailer "a". In words, the distributor will not skip a retailer in offering contracts. Lemma 3.5. 1$ iMAX < n, then the distributor's menu slzould also contain a contract that will be taken by retailer "a", whose coeficient of risk aversion p, < pi,,, . In words, i f tirere is a less risk averse retailer in JV who is not included in .M(9), then it is in the distributor i interest to include such a retailer by offering a suitable contract.
We have shown that it is in the distributor's interest to offer a menu such that every retailer selects a contract from it. Now we shall investigate the structure of the optimal menu of contracts.
Lemma 3.6. In the optimal (and undominated) menu of contracts, there will be (exactly) one risk free contract.
Proof. If the most risk averse retailer, namely retailer 1, is not offered a risk free contract in the optimal menu, theh consider offering this retailer the contract, Fi = rl , cl = p. This contract has a lower EV (by Property 7), will be taken by the most risk averse retailer (and any others who have the same reservation utility), and will not affect the decisions of other retailers who have a larger reservation utility. This proves the lemma. I
It should be noted that the risk free contract is a less expensive contract for the distributor to offer because the distributor does not have to pay any risk premium.
However, the distributor has to offer all retailers the same menu of contracts. To entice all retailers and maximize profits simultaneously she may perforce have to the offer "riskier" contracts, with (ci < p). On the other hand, the distributor always has the option of designing the risk free contract to attract more than just the most risk averse retailer. Let k be the number of retailers that take the risk free contract in the optimal menu. Before determining the optimal value of k we require the optimal structure of the menu of contracts offered to retailers, k + I , k + 2 , . . . , n. To obtain this characterization we make an additional assumption, namely that the reservation utility, ri is an increasing and strictly convex function of pi. This assumption holds good when e > c > s, o > 0, Si > 0, and the demand distribution is continuous, see Lemma 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. For a given value of k (i-e., retailers 1,2, . . . , k accept the risk free contract, .Fk = rk, CA = p), the distributor's pro31 is maximized by ofering the contract (8, ci), i 2 k + 1 given by, Proof. The theorem will be proved by induction on the value of n. Throughout the proof, we assume that i 2 k + I . Without loss of generality, we shall also assume pi > pi+l. Before we prove the theorem, we need some additional properties of the contracts, (F,,ci) given in Equations (I 7) and (1 8).
(a) By the assumption of strict convexity of r; and Equation (I 7), c; is strictly decreasing in pi. (b) From Equations (17) is increasing in p. Thus, as retailer i obtains the same EU from the two contracts, retailer i + 1 strictly prefers the contract (F;+I, ci+,) to (F; ci) (d) It follows from (b) and (c) above that given the menu of contracts in Equations (17) and (1 8 (e) It also follows that, given: (i) retailers i and i + 1 obtain EU's of ri and ri+l; and (ii) we wish retailer i to continue taking his contract and not switch to the contract offered to retailer i+ 1; then the maximum price that the distributor can charge retailer i + 1 is given by Equation (17) The right-hand side of thls inequality is decreasing in ci+l, and equality is attained when (f) Assume we are given that: (i) retailers i and i + 1 obtain EU's of ri and ri+l; and that (ii) we wish that none of retailers 1,2,. . . , i should switch to the contract offered to retailer i + 1. Then the value of ci+l in Equation ( 1 7) maximizes the distributor's profit. This conclusion follows from the maximality of ci+l shown in (e) above and Property 7. Now we are in a position to prove the theorem. From (a)-(f), the theorem is true when n = k + 1. Let the theorem be true for some n > k. We will prove that the theorem is true for n + 1 . Assume that we are given an alternate menu of contracts for the n + 1 retailers, denoted by kalt. By the induction hypothesis, the distributor's EV from the contracts offered to retailers k + 1, k + 2 , . . . , n is maximized by using the menu given in Equations (17) and (18). Denote the contract offered to retailer n + 1 in Jf (Salt), as (<atI, c:!,) . Replace the contracts offered to the retailers k + 1 , k + 2 , . . . , n in Jt (2!,11) , by the menu given in Equations (17) and (18). This switch will not increase the EVs of these contracts. If necessary, change the value of F:!] and reduce the EU of retailer n + 1 to r,,,. This will not increase the contract's EV. Finally, for retailer (n + I ) , change to the contract given in Equations (17) and (18). This will not increase its EV by (e) above. We have therefore shown that given any alternate menu of contracts (for retailers (k + I ) , . . . , n), the menu given in the theorem has an equal or smaller EV.
. We summarize the properties.-of the optimal menu of contracts.
1 . From Property 8, the distributor makes a profit from all contracts. 2. The prices charged to the retailers are decreasing in i, i.e., ci > ci+l,i 1 ( k + 1).
3.
From Property 3, the fixed side payments made to the retailers are decreasing in i, i.e., F;-> F;.+l,i 2 ( k + I ) . 4 . From Property 7 and the fact that retailer i obtains the same EU from contracts (8, c i ) and ( E + l , ci+,) , the EV's of the contracts (E,ci) are increasing in i 2 k. 5. Retailers 1 , 2 , . . . , k -1 obtain EU's greater than their reservation utility. All other retailers get exactly their reservation utility.
We will now discuss how many retailers should get the fixed contract, i.e., the decision variable is now k. The distributor's profit maximization problem is (see problem (P)):
where F, and ci are as defined in Equations (1 7) and (18). This problem can be solved numerically using a search technique.
Future research and conclusion
This paper demonstrates that an important role of an intermediary in distribution channels is to reduce the risk faced by retailers. The sharing of risk can be achieved by offering mutually beneficial risk sharing contracts which also raise the retailers' order quantity to the expected value maximizing quantity. Thus inefficiency created due to risk aversion on part of the retailers can be avoided.
We have shown that it is to the benefit of the distributor to offer a completely risk free contract to one (or more) of the most risk averse retailers. In practice this can be interpreted as an integrated channel in which the distributor owns the retail channel. We wish to emphasize that the distributor need not necessarily be risk neutral. The most efficient outcome is possible (i.e., the solution that yields the highest expected profit in the supply chain) only when the distributor is risk neutral. Otherwise, a person who is less risk averse than all the retailers will still find it beneficial to perform the role of risk intermediation.
We have also demonstrated an important decentralization result. The distributor is responsible for the ordering decision in our model, and the retailer is shown to be content with this arrangement. Therefore, even if there are economies of scale in distribution (for e.g., risk pooling), the distributor will offer the menu of contracts, and independently optimize with respect to her distribution costs. We can also extend our results to the case when the retailers are of different size (Assumption 1). In that case the retailer population can be partitioned into classes of retailers that are similar in size. A separate menu can then be derived for each size class.
Our analysis forms the basis for generalizations that have to be,explored to get a more comprehensive insight into channej structure. Of particular interest is the case when there is competition between the distributors. As discussed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) there may not be an equilibrium in this market. Anotber case of interest is when the price p is a decision variable (i.e., the retailers are price setters). In this case the presence of the distributor may result in higher prices and lower consurnption. In future work, we also plan to study the effects of different size of markets, correlation of retailer demands, and of effort aversion on incentives for risk sharing.
; , = F, + ( pc,)p -PI(P -Ci)2$/2, (~2 ) same EV from hir contract as retailer i from the contract ( 6 ,~i ) .
r k > F , + (~-c i )~-p~( p -~i )~$ / 2 . (A3)
Equations (Al) and (A3) imply, Proof. From Property 2, we know that ci 2 cj. Therefore, as retailer j prefers the contract (4, cj),
whereas Equations (A2) and (A3) imply,
